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LIFE INSURANCE CONDITIONAL
RECEIPTS AND JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION
ARNOLD P. ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
A common tool in the life insurance industry is the binding
or conditional receipt in return for payment of the first pre-
mium. The use of the conditional receipt is generally as fol-
lows: A life insurance agent will make contact with a prospect,
and if all goes well, the decision is made to purchase insur-
ance. Often times it is necessary to have the prospective in-
sured also undergo a physical examination before the policy is
issued. Conditional receipts or binders are utilized during this
interim period between application and delivery of the policy.
Part of the objective is to commit the proposed insured so
that if the company is willing to underwrite, the insured is
psychologically committed to the company taking the
application.
Life insurance premium receipts have generally been put
in three classifications: (1) Insurable risks or satisfaction bind-
ers in which insurance takes effect at the time of payment or
physical exam (whichever is latest) if, under objective stan-
dards, the applicant was insurable on the date in question; (2)
Binders in which no insurance comes into effect until it has
been approved by an authorized official of the company; (3)
Nonconditional temporary insurance during the pendency of
the application.1
Numerous factual situations come to bear on a conditional
receipt, but generally the difficulties arise because of death or
change in health during the interim period between applica-
tion and issuance of policy. In litigated cases, the insurance
company either rejects the application or moves to rescind the
policy upon obtaining knowledge of the death or changed
* B.A., St. Olaf College, 1961; J.D., Marquette University, 1969. Mr. Anderson is a
partner in the law firm of Carroll, Parroni, Postlewaite, Anderson & Graham, S.C.,
Eau Claire, Wisconsin.
1. See Comment, Life Insurance Receipts: The Mystery of the Non-binding
Binder, 63 YALE L.J. 523, 528 (1954); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 943 (1948).
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health of the proposed insured. The question then becomes
whether there was a contract of insurance in effect pursuant
to the conditional receipt.
A life insurance company does not have broad rights of
cancellation after a policy is in effect. Thus it will usually take
the precautions necessary to avoid underwriting an uninsur-
able risk. Nevertheless, because of the construction put on
conditional receipts by some courts, life insurance companies
have been held to have issued an interim policy to an individ-
ual who was not insurable by objective underwriting stan-
dards.2 This approach has in turn raised a number of ques-
tions. For example: Are conditional receipts and binders
"unconscionable"? Are proposed insureds really "consumers"
whose status necessitates judicial intervention to put an in-
sured and insurer "on equal footing" and provide insurance
coverage? These issues will be addressed by a review of the
rationales various courts have applied in dealing with life in-
surance conditional receipts.
II. INTERIM INSURANCE
A. General
A number of courts have interpreted the terms of a condi-
tional receipt as being conditions subsequent. Thus, insurance
is in effect as soon as a premium is paid. In order to void or
nullify the receipt (and insurance coverage), an insurer must
establish that the proposed insured was not insurable when
the application was issued.3 Other cases have held there is in-
terim insurance, but have done so on the basis of the negli-
gence of the defendant insurance company in handling the
application.4
2. See Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 649 (1975); Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 324 Pa. 97, 187 A. 403 (1936).
3. The following cases recognize that temporary insurance contracts are in effect
upon payment of the initial premium. Turner" v. Worth Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 132, 472
P.2d 1 (1970); Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 649 (1975); Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633
(1954); Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151, 483 P.2d 682
(1971); Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 227 Md. 393, 177 A.2d 417 (1962); Allen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965); Daum v. National Ins.
Co. of Am., 200 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1972); Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa.
Super. Ct. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
4. Damm v. National Ins. Co. of Am., 200 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1972). See also
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Some courts which have embraced the concept of interim
insurance still hold that once the applicant has actual notice
of rejection, there can be no interim insurance.5 In addition,
the court in Harp v. Valley Forge Life Insurance Co.' held
there was no temporary life insurance under the conditional
receipt where the applicant failed to take the required physi-
cal exam.
Other courts, which recognize interim insurance, require
the beneficiary to prove the applicant was insurable on the
date of the completion of his or her medical examination. The
determination of insurability must be made in good faith.
Thus, the standard is whether a reasonably prudent author-
ized officer of the insurance company, acting in good faith,
would find the applicant insurable and acceptable for insur-
ance under the company's rules and practices. For example, in
South Coast Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson, the chief
underwriter for the defendant insurance company testified
that the applicant was not insurable as of the date of the last
examination according to the company's underwriting stan-
dards and practices. This fact, as well as a lack of showing of
bad faith on the part of the company, resulted in judgment
for the beneficiary being reversed.
Some jurisdictions have held there is interim insurance in
effect as soon as any money is paid, and do so by expanding
the normal rules of contract.8 For example, in Goucher v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,9 interim insurance
was held to be in existence pursuant to a conditional receipt,
even though the insurance company had advised the insured
that the initial application had been rejected. The insurance
company had, however, countered with a different policy
Etheridge v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 114 Ga. App. 807, 152 S.E. 2d
773 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 233 Ga. 231, 154 S.E.2d 369 (1967).
5. Fabrizio v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 248, 494 P.2d 953 (1972);
Prince v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967). See also
DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co., 79 N.J. 257, 398 A.2d 1274 (1979); 43 AM. JuR. 2d
Insurance § 218 (1969); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 230(3) (1945).
6. 577 S.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. Tex. 1979).
7. 483 S.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. Tex. 1972).
8. See Goucher v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 113 R.I. 672, 324 A.2d 657
(1974); Service v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 201 Kan. 196, 440 P.2d 944 (1968); Simpson
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 227 Md. 393, 177 A.2d 417 (1962).
9. 113 R.I. 672, 324 A.2d 657 (1974).
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which required an increased premium. Rather than holding
that the counteroffer was a rejection of the earlier application,
the court held the conditional receipt continued in existence
without the requirement of any additional health
examination."0
In Simpson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,11 the
Maryland Supreme Court held that a contract of insurance
was in effect as soon as the applicant paid the first premium
and the company issued a receipt. However, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, in a subsequent case, was not willing to
apply the interim contract theory on a disability income and
accident policy where the applicant was a sixteen-year old for
whom the agent had accepted premiums and issued condi-
tional receipts. In that instance, the applicant was too young
to be insured for coverage applied for under the company's
honest and objective standards of insurability. 12
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Crites,3 with
limited discussion, held the insured was afforded temporary
insurance from the date of the completion of the application
until the date of death when the company had neither ac-
cepted nor rejected the application. The application provided
that insurance would be in effect only in the event it was ap-
proved by the home office and then it would take effect from
the date of completion of the application. Simses v. North
American Co. for Life and Health Insurance,4 held that a
reasonable reading of the conditional receipt warranted the
conclusion that if the first premium were paid, coverage would
come into immediate effect. In addition, the court stated that
if the insurance company did not want the policy to take ef-
fect until it had actually determined that the applicant was a
standard risk, it could easily have stated that in precise lan-
guage. Thus, because the company had chosen to utilize an
ambiguous receipt, it had to bear the burden of any resulting
confusion. If, however, the company had notified the proposed
10. Id. at -, 324 A.2d at 660.
11. 227 Md. 393, 177 A.2d 417 (1962).
12. Cannon v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 263 Md. 463, 283 A.2d 404 (1971).
13. 29 Colo. App. 394, 487 P.2d 608 (1971).
14. 175 Conn. 77, 394 A.2d 710 (1978).
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insured that he was not an acceptable risk, the policy would
have terminated.15
Indiana courts have held that a conditional receipt issued
by a life insurance company constitutes an obligation which, if
supported by payment of premium, gives to the applicant a
basis for concluding that there is a contract in existence.16
These decisions were based in part on public policy prohibit-
ing an insurer from collecting premiums for a period when it
would not incur any risk.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Dunford v. United of
Omaha,7 and in Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Insur-
ance Co.,"8 adopted the temporary contract of insurance con-
cept, holding that under certain circumstances the conditional
premium receipt creates temporary insurance subject to the
conditions subsequent, that is, rejection of the application by
the insurance company. The rationale utilized by the Idaho
court included the concept of unequal bargaining power be-
tween the applicant and the company, complex and ambigu-
ous phrasing of the contract and the critical analysis of the
conditional receipt.
In Service v. Pyramid Life Insurance Co.,'9 and Tripp v.
Reliable Life Insurance Co.,20 the Kansas Supreme Court held
that interim insurance comes into effect immediately upon
payment of premium, basing its decision upon the payment of
premium and the concept that there would be no benefit to
the insured during the interim period if insurance was not ef-
fective. In addition, in Tripp the binder contained a typical
provision that the company would have sixty days from the
date of receipt to determine the insurability of the proposed
15. See also Hart v. Travelers Ins. Co., 236 A.D. 309, 258 N.Y.S. 711 (1932), af'd
per curiam, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1933), where interim insurance was held to
be in force. But see Erath v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 25 A.D.2d 707, 268 N.Y.S.2d
235 (1966), adhering to the more traditional view and holding no temporary insurance
came into existence.
16. Meding v. Prudential Ins. Co., 444 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Kaiser v.
National Farmers Union Life Ins. Co., 339 N.E.2d 599 (Ind. App. 1976); Monumental
Life Ins. Co. v. Hakey, 354 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. App. 1976). See also Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 237 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1956).
17. 95 Idaho 282, 506 P.2d 1355 (1973).
18. 94 Idaho 151, 483 P.2d 682 (1971).
19. 201 Kan. 196, 440 P.2d 944 (1968).
20. 210 Kan. 33, 499 -P.2d 1155 (1972).
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insured. Death occurred forty-five days after the sixty-day pe-
riod had elapsed. Nevertheless, temporary insurance was held
to continue past the sixty-day time period.2'
B. Reasonable Expectations
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has been applied
in various ways. For instance, it has been applied to interpret
specific terms in the policy. 22 It has also been utilized to es-
tablish what an insured may reasonably expect under the pol-
icy rather than an analysis of specific terms S.2 However, prior
to doing so, courts had determined that there were ambiguous
policy provisions present justifying such an approach. More
recently, some courts have invoked the doctrine of reasonable
expectations without first establishing the existence of an
ambiguity.2 5
In the cases which have applied reasonable expectations to
conditional receipts, the doctrine is applied to the transaction,
rather than to an interpretation of terms. This application
puts a priority on the status of the parties and the relation-
ship between insured and insurer. Rather than looking to the
language of the conditional receipt, courts have determined
what an insured would expect from a combination of (1) the
presence of a standard form binder, (2) the insurance com-
pany, and (3) the perceived inequitable status between in-
sured and insurer. The result is the application of reasonable
expectation to a perceived inequitable relationship. The tran-
sition from an interpretation of policy to inequitable standing
is made, and the payment of money, together with receipt of
21. Id. at - 499 P.2d at 1159.
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 60 Wis. 2d 620, 211 N.W.2d 431
(1973).
23. See, e.g., Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d
595 (1978). A reasonable person would expect coverage for all civil liability, including
statutory damages, arising out of an occurrence.
24. See Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965). See
also Couey v. National Benefit Life Ins. Co., 77 N.M. 512, 424 P.2d 793 (1967).
25. Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737
(1975), dealing with health and accident insurance policy. See also Keeton, Insurance
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970); Note,
24 S.D.L. Rav. 200, 200-16 (1979); Cohen, Flight Insurance: Conforming to the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 30 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 19 (1979); Kelso,
Idaho and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, XLVII INS. COUNSEL J. 325
(1980).
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the standard form binder, equals an expectation of insurance
coverage where, in fact, none existed according to the terms of
the conditional receipt. This transfer from policy to status is
made by use of reasonable expectations as well as describing
such receipts as unconscionable and adhesion contracts.
An early application of the concept of reasonable expecta-
tions in a conditional receipt case was Ransom v. Penn Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co.28 There, a number of reasons were
given for holding temporary life insurance was in effect imme-
diately upon payment of premium despite the language in the
receipt. First, the language of the receipt was found to be am-
biguous.27 Second, the court concluded that an ordinary per-
son paying a premium would expect insurance and, therefore,
had a "reasonable expectation" of immediate coverage.28
Third, it noted the monetary and psychological advantage
gained by an insurance company in receiving the premium at
the time of application. 9
The court in Collister v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co.30
viewed insurance as imposing stringent requirements upon the
insurer. The reasonable expectations of the insured were the
important consideration, and, in addition, the insured was not
under a duty to read the policy sent by the company. Regard-
less of ambiguity or lack of it, the court held that the appli-
cant had the right to expect something of comparable value in
return for a premium.31 Furthermore, the insurance industry
was chastised for what were characterized as lengthy, com-
plex, and cumbersomely written applications, conditional re-
ceipts and policies.32 Also criticized was the practice of forcing
the insurance consumer to rely upon the oral representations
of the insurance agent.33 The court went on to hold that the
insurance company had failed to establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the proposed insured did not have a rea-
26. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d 633, 635 (1954).
27. Id. at -, 274 P.2d at 636.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 479 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089
(1979).
31. Id. at -, 388 A.2d at 1353.
32. Id.
33. Id.
19801
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sonable expectation of insurance coverage beginning with pay-
ment of the first premium.4
An extreme application of reasonable expectations in con-
ditional receipt cases is illustrated in Smith v. Westland Life
Insurance Co. 3 5 In Smith, the widow brought an action
against the insurance company to collect $10,000 under an al-
leged temporary life insurance contract. Prior to his death,
the proposed insured, Smith, had been advised he was not in-
surable at the standard rate, and that his application had
been rejected. An amended application was offered to Smith
which would take effect if he signed an amendment to the ap-
plication specifying the proposed changes in coverage and
payment of an additional $4.57 for the first month's premium.
The initial amount obtained by the insurance company was
not returned at that time. Smith refused to accept the policy
as amended and refused to pay the additional premium. The
insurance agent told Smith that the premium would be re-
funded. Prior to the refunding of the premium, however,
Smith died in an automobile accident. On appeal the Califor-
nia Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that an ordinary
person paying the premium at the time of application would
have a reasonable expectation of immediate coverage. 6 The
court also admonished the insurance industry for failing to
clarify ambiguities and for being content to endure resulting
litigation in an effort to avoid its obligation to pay pursuant to
the concept of temporary insurance.3 The court went on to
hold that temporary insurance established by payment of an
initial premium would be terminated only by a notice of rejec-
tion and refund of the premium. 8 The court reasoned that
the fact the premium had not been returned created uncer-
tainty and was confusing to the insured. Thus, under the cir-
cumstances, the court held that Smith could reasonably ex-
pect that his temporary insurance would remain in effect
during the course of the negotiations and would continue until
he had been refunded this premium. 9 The dissent of Justice
34. Id. at -, 388 A.2d at 1355.
35. 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975).
36. Id. at 121, 539 P.2d at 439, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
37. Id. at 122, 539 P.2d at 440, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
38. Id. at 125, 539 P.2d at 442, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
39. Id. at 127, 539 P.2d at 444, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
[Vol. 63:593
LIFE INSURANCE
Clark, joined by Justices McComb and Richardson, pointed
out that the unequivocal rejection of the insurance prevented
any reasonable expectation of temporary insurance coverage
and any ambiguity was eliminated. 0
C. Reasonable Expectations in Non-Life Insurance Cases
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has been applied
to a variety of insurance policies.41 For example, in the North
Dakota case of Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc.,42 the in-
sured had a judgment rendered against it for damages caused
by aerial crop spraying. The insured farmer had a comprehen-
sive general liability policy as well as an umbrella policy. The
comprehensive general liability policy excluded coverage for
property damage arising out of any substance released or dis-
charged from any aircraft. The umbrella policy excluded cov-
erage for liability arising out of any substance released or dis-
charged from any aircraft. -The insured never read the policies
nor was he aware of the exclusionary clauses. The trial court
determined that the two policies were ambiguous.43 Because it
was reasonable for the insured farmer to expect coverage for
normal farming operation, the insured's reasonable expecta-
tions prevailed and coverage was found. On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld the lower court's holding find-
ing that the clauses were ambiguous, and upheld the insured's
reasonable expectations where an ambiguity could be found.4
So, also, in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 45
the court stated, with respect to a marine insurance policy,
that the guide to interpretation was reasonable expectations
of the ordinary businessman when making an ordinary busi-
40. Application of the concepts of reasonable expectations and contracts of adhe-
sion to insurance policies was also criticized in the dissenting opinion of Justice Pom-
eroy in Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 388 A.2d 1346
(1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
41. See C & J Fertilizer v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
1975) (coverage for burglary but no marks on exterior of premises); Corgatelli v.
Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975) (construing a
health and accident policy); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d
284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) (purchase of flight insurance from vending machine).
42. 250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1977).
43. Id. at 667.
44. Id. at 673.
45. 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
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ness contract.46
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.,47 involved an insured ac-
cused of assault and battery who contended the actions in
question were in self defense. The policy contained an exclu-
sion for intentional acts. The insurance company refused to
defend. The court held the policy was ambiguous and con-
cluded it would be reasonable for the insured to expect cover-
age in the face of such an ambiguity.48
D. Contract of Adhesion
Contracts of adhesion have been defined49 as form con-
tracts submitted on a "take it or leave it" basis. An adhesion
contract is based on inequality of bargaining between two par-
ties and grew out of the use of modern commercial contracts.
They are generally characterized by a lack of knowledge of
one party to the agreement and the fact that it is written en-
tirely by the other party. Generally, these contracts are
drafted and presented to the public as opposed to individuals.
The drafter writes the contract to his or her best advantage
and the adhering party has no chance to bargain. If the organ-
ization offering the contract has little or no competition, or
the buyer does not have an opportunity for comparative shop-
ping, there may be, in effect, no choice for the buyer. The con-
tract of adhesion concept is an attempt to equalize the bar-
gaining position between the parties and to rectify the
inequities in standing which were present when the contract
was entered intoY°
With respect to life insurance, the proposed purchaser of a
life insurance policy is depicted as being in an unequal bar-
gaining position, not knowing as much about insurance as the
agent. The proposed insured does not have the latitude to
change any of the items in the proposed contract but rather is
46. Id. at 51, 120 N.E. at 87.
47. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). See also Steven v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1963).
48. 65 Cal. 2d at -, 419 P.2d at 169-70, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
49. Id. at - 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
50. A number of writers have accepted insurance contracts as adhesion contracts.
See Hollman, Insurance As A Contract of Adhesion, 1978 INs. L.J. 274, 274-83
(1978); 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1446 at 490 (1962); see also Ehrenzweig, Adhesion
Contracts in the Conflict of Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953).
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tendered the policy on a take it or leave it basis. 5 1
E. Unconscionability
Unconscionability has been found by some courts in inter-
preting an insurance contract in order to correct perceived in-
equities between insured and insurer. The concept of ,umcon-
scionability was originally set forth under the Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-302 in an effort to resolve the
problem relating to standardized agreements.52 Section 2-302
was a step apart from common law doctrines in an effort to
develop rules to prevent unfair surprise and oppression. 8
An early case dealing with the concept of unconscionability
and insurance policies was Western and Southern Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Vale" wherein the Indiana Supreme Court held it
was unconscionable to deny coverage under a conditional re-
ceipt situation for an industrial insurance contract for the loss
of an arm. More recently in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York, 55 the California Supreme Court discussed un-
conscionability with respect to an exclusion clause in a life in-
surance policy purchased at an airport. The court looked upon
the contract as one of adhesion because it was purchased from
a vending machine and the insured was unable to review the
terms of the policy until after purchase.5 In like manner, the
Iowa Supreme Court in C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mu-
tual Insurance Co.57 dealt with the concept of unconscionabil-
ity in a claim against the defendant insurance company for
losses sustained as a result of a burglary. Employees had
locked all exterior doors prior to the burglary, and the insured
claimed that although the exterior of the premises had not
been damaged or marked, the thief had broken an interior
door and stolen $9,582.00 worth of chemicals.58 In addition,
51. 7 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900 (3d ed. 1963). See also Shan-
non v. Prudential Ins. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 592, 218 A.2d 880 (1966) noted in Allen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965).
52. For origins of standardized contracts, see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
53. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
54. 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938).
55. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
56. Id. at _-, 377 P.2d at 297-98, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
57. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
58. Id. at 173.
1980]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
there were truck tire marks visible in the driveway leading to
an entrance of the warehouse that could be forced without
leaving visible marks. The defendant insurance company de-
nied coverage on the grounds that the policy defined a bur-
glary as including and requiring a felonious entry by force or
violence and visible marks made by tools, explosives or physi-
cal damage to the exterior of the premises at the place of such
entry. The trial court held the policy was unambiguous and
the insurance company prevailed. On appeal, in a five to four
decision, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, basing its deci-
sion, inter alia, upon unconscionability and reasonable expec-
tations. The contract was not before the parties when they
purchased the protection and there was utilization, in the
court's opinion, of fine print with a limitation that covers
items not separately listed in the exclusion section.5 9
III. CASES HOLDING No INTERIM INSURANCE
The cases discussed within seem to indicate a trend of de-
cisions establishing insurance as soon as a premium is paid.
Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions continue to hold that
conditional receipts are not ambiguous and there is no insur-
ance until the completion of conditions in the receipt.6 0 The
provisions in the receipt are deemed to be conditions prece-
dent. Courts so holding adhere to the traditional view that a
contract (receipt) will be looked to first and unless there is
some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no effort to go outside
the conditional receipt. In effect, these decisions are based on
a determination that conditional receipts do not justify judi-
cial intervention, that is, an equalization of the status of the
insured and insurer. For example, in Williams v. First Colony
Life Insurance Co.61 the court looked at public policy consid-
erations from the standpoint of both insured and insurer. The
court in Williams addressed the apparent inequity of allowing
an insurance company collecting a premium to cover a period
59. Id. at 179. For a detailed analysis of the concept of unconscionability and the
impact of courts, see Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial
Process, 49 INn. L.J. 367 (1974). See also Comment, Binding Receipts in California, 7
STAN. L. REv. 292 (1955).
60. See notes 36-44 supra.
61. 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979).
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when, in fact, no coverage exists.6 2 On the other hand, the
court also recognized that an insurance company must collect
a premium as earnest money before it incurs the expenses of
paying for a medical examination and processing the applica-
tion.8 The court stated that the inability to impose conditions
precedent could result in some individuals having a difficult
time obtaining insurance, if it could be done at all.4
In Erath v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,6 5 insur-
ance did not become effective upon execution of the applica-
tion and payment of the premium. The conditions in the re-
ceipt were conditions precedent which had, in fact, not been
met. Thus, there was no insurance.6 In like manner, in John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McNeill,67' the Court
of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the rule that under an insur-
able risk conditional receipt, temporary insurance coverage is
not provided until the applicant complies with the conditions
precedent to coverage. The court did, however, find that there
was temporary insurance coverage in accordance with the ap-
plication for insurance, inasmuch as prior to the date of
death, the applicant had complied with all the conditions pre-
cedent to that coverage; that is, payment of premium and
passing a physical examination. The insurance company in
McNeill urged that the applicant was not insurable because of
his personal habits, particularly his fondness of drinking, and.
that he had recently been convicted of drunk driving. 8 The.
court, however, brushed that aside, finding that the rules of
the company did not clearly outline whether those circum-
stances would preclude issuance of the policy 9 In essence, it
62. Id. at 537.
63. Id.
64. Id. But see Long v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 29 Utah 2d 204, 506 P.2d 375
(1973), and Prince v. Western Empire Life his. Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d 163
(1967), holding that conditional receipts create temporary insurance coverage until
the insured was notified that his application was rejected.
65. 25 A.D.2d 707, 268 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1966).
66. Contra, Hart v. Travelers Ins. Co., 236 A.D. 309, 258 N.Y.S. 711 (1932), affd
per curiam, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1933). See also Adams v. State Capital Life
Ins. Co., 11 N.C. App. 678, 182 S.E.2d 250 (1971); Maldonado v. First Nat'1 Life Ins.
Co., 79 N.M. 354, 443 P.2d 744 (1968); Grandpre v. Northwestern Natl Life Ins. Co.,
261 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 1977).
67. 27 Ariz. App. 502, 556 P.2d 803 (1976).
68. Id. at -, 556 P.2d at 807-08.
69. Id. at -, 556 P.2d at 808.
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was held that an applicant is not required to read the mind of
an underwriter. The determination of whether a particular in-
sured was insurable is based on the objective conditions as of
the last physical examination. Thus, according to McNeill, an
insurance company could reject an application and counter-
offer on the basis of the subjective standards but, during that
interim between the date of the last examination and the
tender of a counteroffer, there would be insurance under the
terms of the conditional receipt if the applicant were objec-
tively insurable.70
In Brown v. Equitable Life Insurance Co.,71 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the provisions in the conditional re-
ceipt were neither ambiguous nor contrary to public law or
policy, and that if interim insurance were to be provided, it
was a task for the legislature, not the courts.72
In Hildebrandt v. Washington National Insurance Co.,
7
the Montana Supreme Court rejected the concept of tempo-
rary contract of life insurance. In Hildebrandt, however, the
applicant was an insurance agent for the defendant and had
dealt only with himself. Thus, the court held the reasoning of
cases creating a temporary contract of life insurance based on
unequal bargaining power did not apply.74
Cases holding that conditions in a receipt are conditions
precedent also require that an insurance company act upon an
application within a reasonable length of time.7 5 Thus, in
those jurisdictions holding there is no temporary insurance
with issuance of a binder, liability may be established if the
company failed to act promptly on the application. This is a
cause of action based on negligence with the requirement that
70. Id. See also Simpson v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 227 Md. 393, 177 A.2d 417
(1962).
71. 60 Wis. 2d 620, 211 N.W.2d 431 (1973).
72. For additional cases holding that conditional receipts were not ambiguous, see
Pawelczyk v. Allied Life Ins. Co., 120 Ariz. 48, 583 P.2d 1368 (1978); Quarles v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., 66 IM. App. 3d 455, 383 N.E.2d 1234 (1978); Reynolds v. Guarantee
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 44 IM. App. 3d 764, 358 N.E.2d 940 (1976).
73. 593 P.2d 37 (Mont. 1979).
74. Id. at 40.
75. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 357 So. 2d 646 (Ala. 1978); Barnes v.
Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1975); Brand v. International In-
vestors Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1974); Peddicord v. Prudential Ins. Co., 498 P.2d
1388 (Okla. 1972); Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435
(1933).
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damages be established. 8 In Barnes v. Atlantic and Pacific
Life Insurance Co.,7 7 the court held that whether an insurer's
delay in issuing a policy from September 8th until the follow-
ing November 6th was an unreasonable period, was a fact
issue. In Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Smith,78 the
court held that a policy issued within twenty-one days was a
reasonable time as a matter of iaw.7 A delay from January 31,
1966, to March 15, 1966, was held to be a sufficient interlude
from which a jury might reasonably conclude that the action
was not taken within a reasonable time. 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Before embracing the principles and concepts of uncon-
scionable and adhesion contracts, as well as reasonable expec-
tations, it is submitted that a court should first determine its
role in conflicts between an insured and an insurance com-
pany. Should a court rectify an assumed unequal bargaining
position between insured and insurer? Are courts in a position
to intervene and to determine the status of a proposed in-
sured with an insurer?
No judgment is made in this article on what is or what is
not needed to put an insured and an insurance company on an
equal footing in their dealings with each other. However, the
basic problem of judicial intervention in conditional receipt
cases is judicial unsuitability to make the necessary factual
determinations such as costs and availability. Courts are not
able to gather data, analyze material or devote continuing at-
tention to an insurance company's problems. 81
Judicial intervention which tries to create a balance be-
tween an insured and insurer often results in the voiding of
exclusions and terms to obtain what the insured reasonably
expected. The cases in part IE illustrate that some courts have
concluded insureds expect no exclusions and as much insur-
76. 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933).
77. 325 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1975).
78. 356 So. 2d 646 (Ala. 1978).
79. Id. at 648. See also Brand v. International Investors Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 423
(Okla. 1974).
80. Peddicord v. Prudential Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1972).
81. See Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49
IND. L.J. 367, 370 (1974).
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ance coverage as can be possibly obtained for the least
amount of money. Faced with increasing judicial intervention
based on the "expectations," insurance companies will be
compelled to either refuse insurance on that basis or collect a
fee commensurately higher to cover the cost. In addition, the
fee will be collected from all prospective applicants whether
they are determined to be insurable and whether they subse-
quently become policy holders.
The problem of interpreting conditional receipts goes far
beyond an individual beneficiary suing to collect the proceeds
for a deceased insured. The concept of fairness goes to availa-
bility of insurance or conditional receipts as well as prices that
must be charged to those who are found insurable. In essence,
the insurance companies, and conditional receipts, must be
regulated. Courts can only exclude or find coverage in individ-
ual cases. A court does not know what will take the place of
any exclusion or conditional receipt which it does away with,
nor is it in a position to regulate the price. Courts do not have
the power to order insurance, nor do they have the power to
set reasonable rates.
It is submitted that the judiciary should not make public
policy determinations based on reasonable expectations, con-
tracts of adhesion, or unconscionability without a detailed
analysis of whether they are supplanting the legislative
branch of government. Failure to address this threshold ques-
tion will result in continued uncertainty and ambiguities. In
addition, such judicial intervention in conditional receipt
cases brings into question states' control and regulation of in-
surance companies. Such a result necessarily follows when
courts make essentially public policy decisions based on rea-
sonable expectations or unconscionability or adhesion theo-
ries. The effect is to dilute the status of each state's regulation
through the commissioner of insurance office. It becomes easy
to argue for nationwide uniform interpretation and regulation
of insurance contracts because of the reasonable expectations
of insured and the interstate nature of life insurance poli-
cies.82 Thus, the individual requirements of each state fades
82. Emphasis on public policy in conditional receipt cases may result in greater
efforts to go behind the "closed doors" of appellate deliberations. Since courts must
base much of their public policy arguments on subjective material not in briefs, it
[Vol. 63:593
LIFE INSURANCE
before the -conceptual generalities applied by judicial
intervention.
An individual's ability to bargain with a life insurance
company may require greater regulation of insurance con-
tracts. Such an objective does not, however, lie in application
of "reasonable expectations," contracts of adhesion or rules of
unconscionability. The answer lies with state legislatures and
offices of commissioners of insurance, dependent in turn upon
each state's insurance needs and experience.
may be argued that public visibility of the decision is necessary to determine what
facts the court is using in its decision making. It is this writer's opinion, however, that
such efforts would be counterproductive and greatly impair the administration of
justice.
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